EXHIBIT 99.1

GARRETT MOTION AUCTION PROCESS YIELDS IMPROVED BIDS

ROLLE, Switzerland – October 19, 2020 – Garrett Motion Inc. (“Garrett”) today announced that it has received an improved stalking horse bid from KPS Capital Partners, LP (“KPS”) with respect to a potential purchase of its business. The Company is continuing with its competitive bidding process, and seeking approval of bidding procedures and stalking horse bid protections from the bankruptcy court.

Garrett also responded today to an October 16, 2020, non-binding proposal from a group of institutional investors and Honeywell International Inc. that the Company sell control to the institutional investors without a further marketing process.

Improved Stalking Horse Bid From KPS

On September 20, 2020, Garrett and certain affiliates of KPS entered into a share and asset purchase agreement (the “Purchase Agreement”) in connection with the proposed purchase of Garrett’s business. The purchase would be implemented through voluntary Chapter 11 cases with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York also commenced by Garrett and certain of its subsidiaries on September 20, 2020 (In re: Garrett Motion, Inc., et al., No. 20-12212 (MEW) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.).

Under the terms and conditions of the revised stalking horse bid received from KPS:

The revised bid from KPS is conditioned on court approval of Garrett’s proposed bidding procedures. The Purchase Agreement would remain subject to higher or better offers in the bankruptcy case. Closing of the transaction is subject to customary regulatory approvals, as well as court approval and other customary conditions. Following court approval of Garrett’s proposed bid procedures, Garrett would work with KPS to amend the Purchase Agreement and other transaction documentation to reflect the terms of the revised bid.

Alternative Proposal Would Discontinue Auction and Sell Control to Certain Institutional Investors

On October 16, 2020, Honeywell International Inc., Centerbridge Partners, L.P. and Oaktree Management L.P. (collectively, the “Bidding Group”) publicly announced that they had entered into a coordination agreement in anticipation of submitting to Garrett an alternative proposal for a plan of reorganization (the “Alternative Proposal”). Garrett received a letter on behalf of the Bidding Group regarding the Alternative Proposal after the public announcement.

The Alternative Proposal was prepared with public information only and had not been negotiated with Garrett. It followed invitations from Garrett to the members of the Bidding Group to join the competitive process alongside other bidders. Garrett understands that the terms of the Alternative Proposal prohibit any participating parties from discussing alternative transactions with Garrett or other third parties during the bankruptcy case. The Alternative Proposal also requests that Garrett agree to stop the competitive process altogether and not seek, solicit or support any alternative to the Alternative Proposal.

The substantive terms of the Alternative Proposal also include a settlement with Honeywell, the cash sale of virtually all equity value of Garrett to the institutional investors party to the Alternative Proposal and special participation rights offered to select institutional investors in return for their support of the Alternative Proposal.

Garrett responded to the Bidding Group today by raising initial questions about the content of the Alternative Proposal, including its impact on the competitive process, the availability and terms of financing and its treatment of remaining Garrett stockholders. Garrett again invited the members of the Bidding Group to participate in what is intended to be an ongoing competitive process, and Garrett intends to continue discussions with the Bidding Group regarding the Alternative Proposal as well.

Information about the Chapter 11 Process

Garrett anticipates emerging from Chapter 11 and completing the sale process in early 2021.

Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC and Perella Weinberg Partners are serving as financial advisors, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP and Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP are serving as legal advisors, and AlixPartners are serving as restructuring advisor to Garrett Motion.

Court filings and other documents related to the Chapter 11 process are available at http://www.kccllc.net/garrettmotion or by calling Garrett’s claims agent, KCC, at 866-812-2297 (U.S. toll-free) or +800 3742 6170 (international toll-free) or sending an email to Garrettinfo@kccllc.com.

Forward-Looking Statements

This press release contains “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. All statements, other than statements of fact, that address activities, events or developments that we or our management intend, expect, project, believe or anticipate will or may occur in the future are forward-looking statements including without limitation our statements regarding our Chapter 11 process and the ongoing competitive process. Although we believe forward-looking statements are based upon reasonable assumptions, such statements involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties, and other factors, which may cause the actual results or performance of the company to be materially different from any future results or performance expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements. Such risks and uncertainties include, but are not limited to those described in our annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2019, as updated by our quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2020, as well as our other filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, under the headings “Risk Factors” and “Cautionary Statement Concerning Forward-Looking Statements.” You are cautioned not to place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date of this document. Forward-looking statements are not guarantees of future performance, and actual results, developments and business decisions may differ from those envisaged by our forward-looking statements.

About Garrett Motion Inc.

Garrett Motion is a differentiated technology leader, serving customers worldwide for more than 65 years with passenger vehicle, commercial vehicle, aftermarket replacement and performance enhancement solutions. Garrett’s cutting-edge technology enables vehicles to become safer, and more connected, efficient and environmentally friendly. Our portfolio of turbocharging, electric boosting and automotive software solutions empowers the transportation industry to redefine and further advance motion. For more information, please visit www.garrettmotion.com.

Garrett Motion:

Michael Cimini

Garrett Motion Inc.

T: 973.216.3986

Michael.Cimini@garrettmotion.com

Arielle Patrick

Edelman

T: 917.624.3004

arielle.patrick@edelman.com

EXHIBIT 99.3

October 16, 2020

By E-mail

Andrew G. Dietderich

Sullivan & Cromwell LLP

125 Broad Street

New York, New York 10004

dietdericha@sullcrom.com

Re: In re: Garrett Motion, Inc., et al., No. 20-12212 (MEW) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.)

Dear Andy,

We write on behalf of Centerbridge Partners, L.P. (“Centerbridge”) and Oaktree Capital Management, L.P. (“Oaktree”), who collectively hold approximately 15% of the Senior Notes and over 9% of the Debtors’ common equity, certain clients of Jones Day who collectively hold approximately 40% of the Debtors’ common equity and some Senior Notes, and Honeywell International Inc. (“Honeywell” and, together with Centerbridge, Oaktree, and the Jones Day clients, the “Plan Sponsors”) in connection with the Debtors’ pending Bid Procedures Motion (ECF No. 18), which is scheduled to be heard on October 21, 2020. As summarized below, the Plan Sponsors have formulated a proposal for a plan of reorganization for the Debtors (the “Proposal”) that, unlike the liquidating plan foreshadowed by the bid from KPS Capital Partners, LP (the “Stalking Horse Bid”), will be supported by all of the Debtors’ major financial constituencies.

The Proposal is described in an exhibit to this letter and, as you know, it was filed publicly with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission today. We are eager to begin working hand in glove with the Debtors and their advisors to cause the Proposal to be evidenced by a plan of reorganization, described in a disclosure statement, filed with the Court, confirmed by the Court, and consummated as promptly as possible.

As an initial matter, the Proposal contemplates a plan of reorganization instead of a sale implemented through a liquidation plan. This will allow the Debtors to move expeditiously through these chapter 11 cases and negate the need for a potentially lengthy, contested, and expensive auction process. A speedy, value-maximizing reorganization that considerably deleverages the Debtors’ balance sheet will send a positive message to the Debtors’ vendors, customers, and other contract counterparties by, among other things, eliminating the series of risks associated with the proposed sale process—addressing concerns about damage to customer relationships that the Debtors have repeatedly expressed to the Court.

The key benefits of the Proposal include:

Apart from the foregoing, the Proposal clearly has a materially higher implied value than the proposed Stalking Horse Bid. The Proposal includes commitments by well-known and highly regarded investment firms to provide the required equity capital through the commitments to purchase at least approximately $1.1 billion of Convertible Series A Preferred Stock that will be used to deleverage the Debtors’ balance sheet. The Convertible Series A Preferred Stock will contain no maintenance covenants and, upon a change of control, the reorganized Debtors may redeem such stock at their election. With a substantial infusion of new equity capital to pay down debt and the conversion of Honeywell’s claim from a liability to new Series B Preferred Stock, the Debtors will emerge from bankruptcy in a healthier and even more competitive position than before they filed these chapter 11 cases.

To replace the Debtors’ existing contractual arrangement with Honeywell, the Proposal provides for a restructured payment stream in the form of Series Preferred B Stock pursuant to which Honeywell will be entitled to receive fixed payments over a 14-year period according to a defined schedule. The Proposal allows the reorganized Debtors to delay payments to Honeywell if EBITDA falls below a certain threshold. The Debtors thus not only stand to benefit from a substantial deleveraging of their balance sheet through the Proposal—which will place them in a superior competitive position for years to come—but they also will have a simplified, predictable stream of future payments going forward and will continue to have a mechanism through which payments to Honeywell are deferred in the event of unexpected fluctuations in future business environments.

As the Proposal demonstrates, there is no need for the Debtors to rush to seek approval of the Stalking Horse Bid. On the contrary, the Proposal restructures the Debtors’ obligations while maintaining the interests of equity in these solvent cases without the need for a $63 million break fee, an uncapped expense reimbursement that is payable regardless of the consummation of the transaction, or time consuming and value destructive litigation. Furthermore, the commitments to provide financing for the Proposal do not include any backstop fee or other financing fee.

2

The Plan Sponsors urge the Debtors to adjourn the hearing on the Bid Procedures Motion until they have had time to seriously consider the Proposal. At such an early stage in these chapter 11 cases, it is unnecessary to bind yourselves to a greater than $63 million cost at the expense of your unsecured creditors and equity holders. The Plan Sponsors believe, and as further supported by the Proposal, that an adjournment of the Bid Procedures Motion will only serve to benefit the Debtors and all of their stakeholders by maximizing the value of the Debtors’ estates.

We request that you confirm in writing as soon as possible that you have forwarded this letter to the Board of Directors of Garrett Motion, Inc. and the “Consulting Professionals” as that term is defined in the Debtors’ Bid Procedures Motion.    

We look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

Enclosure

3

EXHIBIT 99.4

[Letterhead of Sullivan & Cromwell LLP]

October 19, 2020

Dennis F. Dunne,

    Milbank LLP,

                55 Hudson Yards,

                             New York, NY 10003.

Nicole Greenblatt,

    Kirkland & Ellis LLP,

                601 Lexington Avenue,

                             New York, NY 10022.

Bruce Bennett, Esq.,

    Jones Day,

                555 S. Flower St., 50th Floor,

                              Los Angeles, CA 90071.

Dear Dennis, Nicole & Bruce:

On behalf of Garrett Motion Inc. (“GMI”) and the other debtors in the above-captioned cases (collectively, the “Debtors”), we would like to thank you and your various clients for the letter of October 16, 2020, summarizing a proposal of plan sponsorship (the “Proposal”). We have shared the Proposal with the GMI’s Board of Directors and the Debtors have directed their advisors to engage with you on the Proposal as part of the ongoing competitive process.¹

As we have said repeatedly, the Debtors welcome participation from Centerbridge, Oaktree and Honeywell in the competitive process and, in particular, are pleased that Honeywell now appears willing to engage in settlement discussions over its claims with the Debtors. However, the sale process is a competitive one, with other parties actively pursuing potential proposals; attempts to stifle competition through lock-up agreements or other coercive arrangements harm the estate unnecessarily.

GMI has announced a sale of its business, and GMI’s Board of Directors therefore has a duty to obtain the highest price reasonably achievable. When the Board considers value for GMI stockholders, it cannot ascribe any value to special inducements offered only to a limited group of individual institutional investors in exchange for their consent to an otherwise inferior or non-committed transaction. These sorts of tactics to build ‘consensus’ make the Board’s decision harder, not easier. As you know, GMI is a Delaware corporation with a large number of creditors and thousands of shareholders, most of whom do not have access to sophisticated restructuring counsel. It is the value received by the stakeholders that are not part of the bidding consortium that is meaningful to the Board of Directors.

With this in mind, the Debtors have identified a number of initial concerns with your Proposal and we would like to engage with you to address them.

First, although the Proposal acknowledges the constraints placed on GMI by its inappropriate capital structure and the need for additional equity, the Debtors are concerned that the Series A Preferred Stock and Series B Preferred Stock may not be treated as full equity equivalents by financial markets, rating agencies and business partners critical to GMI’s future success. The quantum and cost of the proposed debt-like elements in these securities appear likely to hamper both strategic transactions and the capital deployment necessary for GMI to remain relevant in its core markets. The terms of the Series A Preferred are extremely costly to the company if paid in cash, or extremely dilutive to the common equity if PIK’d. This likely will have consequences for the future value of the equity held by current GMI stockholders, and could negatively impact the financial viability of the reorganized company and the availability and terms of exit financing. As a result, we are interested in exploring ways of reducing the cost and dilution of this structure.

Second, the Proposal is in substance a sale of GMI for cash to selected stockholders. Non-participating GMI stockholders suffer near total dilution from the issuance of the Series A Preferred Stock but receive only a very modest investment opportunity (less than 5% of the Series A Preferred Stock) in return. Accordingly, the Debtors have not been able to determine based on information available to them that the Proposal is superior to the current proposed stalking horse bid, or to any other alternative sale. Among other things, it is unclear how the Proposal allocates value to those portions of the business that are free of potential claims from Honeywell. This is important, of course, because that allocated value should be available for distribution to GMI stockholders. As a result, the Debtor is interested in exploring ways of expanding value to all stockholders.

Third, the interests of non-participating GMI stockholders have been represented in settlement negotiations with Honeywell. In particular, under the Proposal, Honeywell is to receive interests that are junior to the Series A Preferred Stock acquired by the Plan Sponsors but senior to the remaining claims of non-participating GMI stockholders.

These features call into question whether the Plan Sponsors have appropriate incentives to negotiate with Honeywell at arm’s-length as a surrogate for the estate and non-participating stockholders. The absence of any review by Centerbridge, Oaktree or their representatives of confidential information of the Debtors is noteworthy in this regard. As a result, the Debtor is interested in working with the Plan Sponsors in improving the terms of the Honeywell settlement for the benefit of all stockholders.

Fourth, the Proposal raises process concerns by linking the otherwise unrelated terms of the equity capital raise to the settlement with Honeywell. The Debtors have not been involved in the pricing of either transaction, or in the plan of reorganization reflected in the Proposal. This dynamic is exacerbated by the near total prohibition preventing any signatory to the “coordination agreement” from considering alternatives, or engaging in discussions with the Debtors that may reveal opportunities for enhanced value to the estate.

Fifth, the Proposal requires significant exit financing in order to satisfy claims of current creditors, but does not identify any providers of that financing or include any meaningful description of its terms, preventing an evaluation of this critical element of the Proposal.

Sixth, Centerbridge and Oaktree have not conducted private-side diligence, presumably in order to remain free to buy and sell stock and claims. Restricting to learn about the Debtors, side by side with other bidders, may be an important next step to ensure no surprises for either side later.

These initial observations are intended to be constructive and not in any way to discourage the participation by this consortium in the competitive process. Indeed, this consortium may be well positioned to deliver a compelling proposal in the ongoing competitive process that benefits the many individual non-participating stakeholders in the Debtors. The Debtors are fully committed to working with the Plan Sponsors to improve the Proposal along those lines.

We look forward to discussing these matters with you.

Very Truly Yours,

/s/ Andy Dietderich

Andy Dietderich

EXHIBIT 99.5

[Letterhead of KPS Capital Partners, L.P.]

October 19, 2020

Garrett Motion Inc.

La Pièce 16

1180 Rolle, Switzerland

Attention: Sean Deason, Jerome P. Maironi

With a copy to:

Sullivan & Cromwell LLP

125 Broad Street

New York, New York 10004

United States

Attention: Scott Miller, Andrew Dietderich

Sullivan & Cromwell LLP

1 New Fetter Lane

London EC4A 1AN

United Kingdom

Attention: Evan S. Simpson

RE: Project Cresco

Dear Messrs. Deason and Maironi:

In this letter (this “Revised Proposal”), we are proposing to make the changes summarized below to our previously announced stalking horse bid (the “Existing Proposal”) for substantially all of the assets of Garrett Motion Inc. (the “Company”), which we believe represents significant additional value for the Company’s stakeholders. Terms that are used but not herein defined have the same meaning ascribed to them in the Share and Asset Purchase Agreement, dated September 20, 2020 (the “SAPA”), by and among Garrett Motion Inc., Garrett Motion Holdings Inc. (“GMHI”), Garrett Motion Holdings II Inc., Garrett ASASCO Inc. (“ASASCO”), AMP Intermediate B.V. and AMP U.S. Holdings, LLC.

Under this Revised Proposal, subject to and conditioned upon (a) the approval by the Court of the Bidding Procedures Order (including by entering into any necessary amendments to the SAPA and approving the Amended Bidding Procedures (as defined below)) and (b) the negotiation, execution and delivery of mutually satisfactory definitive documentation providing for this Revised Proposal (including the necessary amendments to the SAPA, the RSA, the Plan and any other Transaction Documents and confirmation to our satisfaction of the tax, structuring and financing impacts of the Revised Proposal), we are proposing the following changes to the Existing Proposal:

*            *             *            *            *